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national terrorist extortionary events which could be found for the period
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In recent years, the world has seen the development of a new and
modern political weapon, international terrorism. This is not meant to
imply that terrorists have never before operated outside the limits of
territorial borders. However, there are several factors which indicate
that international terrorism is indeed a modern phenomenon. Modern modes
of transportation, particularly the jet airliner, have made it easy for
terrorists to rapidly export their violence to other countries and even
other continents. The availability of modern explosives and sophisticated
weaponry has allowed terrorists to strike with greater accuracy and con-
centrated destructive force. Since terrorists often seek to disrupt the
normal order of things, increased political and economic' interaction be-
tween nations has offered new targets for terrorist attack both at home
and abroad. Finally, the dramatic increase in the frequency of incidents
of international terrorism as well as its use by numerous groups of polit-
ical extremists in all parts of the world, indicate that it is a modern
problem which confronts all nations as it never has before.
International terrorism is a phenomenon which is easy to recognize,
but at the same time difficult to define. The type of terrorism which is
the subject of this study can be defined as violence, the threat or use
of which is politically motivated. It is not an end in itself, but a
means of achieving specific goals. Terrorism is violence which is per-
sonal in nature and conducted outside the generally accepted rules of war-
fare. Normally in war there are categories of civilians who are considered
immune to violence because they are not actively engaged in the struggle.

Examples include women, children, and representatives of international
agencies. The terrorist, however, does not recognize this immunity.
Additionally, although the specific and immediate objectives of
terrorism, as well as the methods employed, may vary widely, the violence
is always designed to create an atmosphere of fear and alarm. 1
International terrorism can be defined as terrorism which deliber-
ately involves or victimizes governments, organizations, diplomats, or
foreign nationals who are not participants in the struggle between the
terrorist and his opponent. When the victim of the violence is a diplo-
mat or other internationally protected person, when international modes
of commerce and travel are involved, or when the violence is exported to
other nations, the terrorist activity can be considered international. 2
One of the most common and apparently most successful types of inter-
national terrorist activity is the act of extortion. In recent years
governments, corporations, and individuals have paid exorbitant ransoms
to secure the freedom of hostages seized by terrorists. Governments have
been pressured into relinquishing some measure of their sovereignty by
releasing prisoners, failing to prosecute apprehended terrorists, or even
allowing them to perpetrate their crime and depart under official protec-
tion. The random nature of international terrorism, and the terrorists
ability to strike out anywhere and at any time, makes every nation in the
world susceptible to terrorist attack. Neither geographical location,
^and Corporation, P-5217, Terrorism Works - Sometimes, by Brian M.
Jenkins, p. 2-3, April 1974.
2Rand Corporation, P-5261, International Terrorism: A New Kind of
Warfare, by Brian M. Jenkins, p. 2, June 1974.
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ideological position, nor political system can exempt a country from the
possibility of being targeted or exploited by international terrorists.
Some governments have chosen to give in to terrorist demands on the
grounds that not to do so only encourages terrorist revenge. On the other
hand, the hope of deterring future terrorist extortion by not allowing
terrorists to profit from their activities has prorated other governments
staunchly to refuse to pay terrorist blackmail. It is the purpose of this
study to observe the various ways in which international terrorists ex-
ploit third party governments, to examine the different reactions which
governments have made to terrorist extortion, and to evaluate both the
immediate and subsequent effects of those reactions.
B. HYPOTHESIS
When international terrorists involve a third party government in an
extortionary event, the actions of that government ultimately determine
its liability and susceptibility to future involvement in similar terror-
ist extortionary activity. It can be further hypothesized that the third
party government which consistently capitulates to terrorist demands will
be viewed by the terrorists as an easy target which can be successfully
exploited in the future. Conversely, the government which consistently
resists and opposes the terrorists will reduce its liability to future
involvement. In other words, future terrorist activity is encouraged by
terrorist success and discouraged by failure.
In order to test the hypothesis, it was determined that quantitative
as well as qualitative analysis would prove useful. The first step in the
research involved the development of a methodology for recording in coded
form the essential elements of a terrorist extortion. Data was then
11

collected in this format on international terrorist extortionary events
from 1968 to 1975. All events which could be identified and about v/hich
information was available were included. Evaluation and analysis con-
cluded the research.
C. SOME DEFINITIONS
Before proceding further, it will prove helpful to explain some of the
terms which will be used throughout this study. The terms terrorism and
international terrorism have already been described. A terrorist extor-
tion can best be considered within the context of a simple kidnapping. A
hostage is seized and threatened with death or physical harm unless the
kidnappers' demands are met. The hostage is normally a person, but could
also be an aircraft, ship, embassy, government building, etc. The hostage
is the victim in an extortionary event. The target of the event is the
person, government, or organization upon whom the demands are made. The
host is the country in which the event takes place. The opposition govern-
ment is the one with which the terrorist organization is in conflict or
opposes. The opposition government is the recognized enemy of the terror-
ist organization. A third party government is one which is not a partici-
pant in the struggle between the terrorist and his opponent. The country
of which the hostage is a citizen is referred to as the hostage government.
Some of the above listed terms apply to the. actors in an international
terrorist extortion while others relate to the possible roles in which those
actors might be cast. The matrix contained in Figure 1 is designed to show
the difference between actors and roles. Two actors who do not appear in
the matrix are the terrorist and his victim. The terrorist always assumes
the role of extortioner in an event, and the victim is his hostage.
12

AN INTERNATIONAL EXTORTIONARY EVENT: THE ACTORS AND THEIR ROLES









Figure 1. An International Extortionary Event:
The Actors and Their Roles
The Figure 1 matrix shows the ways in which opposition and third party
governments can be involved in an international terrorist extortion. A
third party government must be cast in at least one of the three roles
for the event to be an international one. The opposition government may
or may not be a participant. This basic matrix can become considerably
larger and contain numerous different possibilities for those events which
invlove multiple third party governments in the various combinations of
roles.
The final term which might require explanation is Bangkok Solution.
The term originated as the result of the 1972 seizure of the Israeli em-
bassy in Bangkok. It refers to the compromise in which the terrorists drop
their demands and release their hostages in return for safe passage out of
the country to one in which they will be granted sanctuary.
13

II. METHODOLOGY FOR RECORDING TERRORIST EXTORTIONARY EVENTS
A. VARIABLE SELECTION AND CODING PROCEDURES
In developing a methodology for recording international terrorist
extortionary events the steps included primarily identifying those varia-
bles of which an event is comprised and then developing categories, codes
and scales suitable for the accurate measuring and recording of the varia-
bles identified. An initial variable list, and coding procedures were
drawn up. This initial list emphasized identification of actors, their
actions relative to the event, extortion demands and payoffs, types and
numbers of hostages, fates of both hostages and terrorists, the impact of
publicity, and the event's relationship to previous or subsequent events.
These variables were chosen as being essential to the testing of the
hypothesis
.
After discussion and interviews with administrators at the State De-
partment, Justice Department, and Central Intelligence Agency, who are
involved in policy on terrorism, it became apparent that the initial
variable list and coding procedures required modification and expansion.
The variables and coding procedures used in the ITERATE Project 3 were ex-
tremely valuable to the revision. In some cases, variables were taken
directly from the ITERATE codebook. In other cases, ITERATE variables
were modified or expanded before being incorporated. Finally, parts of
the ITERATE codebook were also used for modifying and expanding previously
selected variables. The second generation variable list and codebook, which
3Mickolus , Edward F. , ITERATE: International Terrorism: Attributes
of Terrorist Events
, a project done for the Office of Political Research
of the Central Intelligence Agency, August 1975.
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can be found in Appendix A, was used for the collection of all data.
B. DATA COLLECTION
1. What Events Were Included
The first step in the data collection phase related to choosing
the events to be included. It was decided that all international terror-
ist extortionary events from 1968 to 1975 would be examined. The follow-
ing criteria were initially established to determine which events would
qualify for use in the study:
a. The event would have to involve a third party government.
b. The event would have to be extortionary in nature. It would
need to contain an action, a hostage, and a demand which has to be met to
secure release of the hostage. Events which involved only extortionary
threats were not included.
c. The event would have to be carried out by a politically moti-
vated organization.
d. The event would have to allow for a decision or action by the
third party government who was involved.
Almost as soon as the data collection phase began, it became
apparent that the above criteria would have to be expanded. Because
international terrorism is characterized by its penchant for operating
outside the normally accepted rules of political action, warfare, and
international law, it is difficult to establish strict rules or criteria
for evaluating terrorist events. Consequently, the above decision rules
for choosing the events to include in the study were expanded as follows:
(1) The third party actor need not be a government. Many
events have been targeted against multi-national corporations rather than
15

governments. This is particularly evident in Argentina where the kidnap-
ping of corporate executives has proved to be a lucrative business. In
these events, the kidnap victim may be valuable because of his position
with the corporation rather than because of his citizenship. The cri-
teria was expanded to include those events involving citizens or corpora-
tions from third party countries even though that country's government
was not a direct participant in the event.
(2) The requirement that an event be extortionary in nature
was changed only slightly to allow for the fact that sometimes the extor-
tionary demands might not be made known or might not be clear. Once a
hostage has been seized, the event qualifies for inclusion in the study.
This allows for the fact that sometimes events do not proceed as the
terrorists would like, and an event can end prior to the demands being
issued. Unsuccessful attempts to seize a hostage, and extortionary threats
when no hostage has been physically seized are not included.
(3) A substantial number of incidents have been perpetrated
by terrorists who were not thoughtful enough to report the organization
with which they were affiliated. There have also been a number of events
which were carried out by individuals rather than organization. Conse-
quently, the requirement that events must be the work of politically
motivated organizations was dropped.
(4) In many terrorist events, the third party actor or govern-
ment is never given the opportunity to act or make a decision relative to
meeting the demands. Normally, one can assume that the third party actor
can, at the minimum, exert pressure on the host government or actor upon
whom demands have been made. Unfortunately, we cannot always determine
16

what role if any the third party actor played in determining the outcome
of an event. Therefore, this criterion also was eliminated.
The requirements, then, for deciding which events to include in the
study and which to reject were reduced because the original criteria were
somewhat unrealistic and entirely too restrictive. Simply stated, the
event had to involve a third party government, citizens, or corporations
from third party countries; be of an extortionary nature, even though the
demands might not be clear or made known; and be an event which develops
sufficiently to allow for a decision by government officials regarding
the management of the event. Unsuccessful attempts, and events in which
the intended victim avoids capture or escapes during the initial seizure
are excluded.
The above criteria adequately describe which events are of interest
in this study, if those events are kidnapping or barricade and hostage
incidents. Another type of event which is of interest is the aircraft
hijacking. In many hijackings the only decision maker is the pilot, and
we assume that the policy which he follows is one of personal survival.
In other events, the only third party involved is the country to which
the aircraft is hijacked, and because the event ends upon arrival, that
country's involvement or actions really do not affect the hostages. The
event is over when the hijacker reaches his destination and releases his
hostages. Certainly a country's policy toward hijackers encourages or
discourages other hijackings, but this research is primarily interested
in decisions made when hostage lives arc in the balance.
The criteria, then, for including hijacking events are that a third
party government be involved as hostage, host, or target of demands; that
17

demands are made, exclusive of those directed at the aircraft crew; and
that a decision be made regarding the management of the event while the
hostages are in custody of the hijackers.
2. Coding an Event
The rules for coding events are contained in Appendix A. This
section, then will not explain the procedure for coding, but rather will
discuss some of the problems, solutions, assumptions, and shortcomings
encountered in coding the events.
Whenever possible, the events were coded from press reports con-
tained in the New York Times . The Rand Corporation Report, " International
Terrorism: A Chronology, 1968-1974 ," by Brian M. Jenkins and Janera Johnson,
and unclassified chronologies provided by the Office of Political Research
of the Central Intelligence Agency as well as the New York Times Index
were used to identify those events to be coded. In twenty- three cases,
the events were coded from the chronologies because no articles in the
New York Times could be found. These events are identified as those which
received zero publicity points.
• The duration of an event is that period of time between the seizure
of the hostage and the determination that there no longer exists a threat
to him. Normally an event ends with the release or demise of the hostage.
However, in some cases where kidnap victims have been killed, their fate
is not known for some time. In these cases, because observers of the
event are unaware that it has ended, the event is not considered ended
until the fate of the hostage is made known.
18

Most of the information about an event is generally reported by the
news media while the event is in progress, although reporting may continue
for a brief period of time after the event has ended. Because of this
reporting style, much of the information which is of a follow-up nature
is never reported. Many questions were raised during the data collection
phase of this research for which answers could not be found. The items
for which information was most often lacking are those which deal with
the fate of a captured terrorist.
The methodology calls for the coding of government and/or non-govern-
ment actor responses. The categories of potential response range from
complete capitulation to terrorist demands to armed confrontation or shoot-
out with the terrorists. The response step in the research is one of the
most important because, this information forms the basis for testing the
hypothesis that government reaction determines future susceptibility to
terrorist extortion. For the majority of cases, it was not difficult to
code this variable. However, in several cases, government response changed
during the course of the event. Most often the change is from a position
of total rejection of terrorist demands to one of compromise or capitula-
tion. In the well known event which occurred during the Munich Olympics
in 1972, however, the West German government's response shifted in the
other direction. Initially the West Germans negotiated with the BSO
terrorists, but the event ended in a shootout. Since the coding procedure
only allows for one response to be recorded, naturally the final one is




One of the primary purposes of terrorism is the generation of
publicity. Terrorist activity captures headlines. The drama of such
events is brought into the homes of millions through television news
coverage complete with live, on-the-scene reports whenever possible. News
media coverage not only dramatizes the event, but also focuses world
attention on the cause which the terrorist represents. In many cases it
would be difficult to determine whether gaining publicity is one of the
terrorist's primary purposes, ot whether it is simply an additional bene-
fit which he receives. In other cases, events appear to be staged to
gain maximum news coverage. One such case was the seizure of the Israeli
athletes at the Munich Olympic Games in 1972. The world wide news coverage
which the games were receiving assured the Black September Organization
(BSO) terrorists who perpetrated the incident a world wide audience to view
the event
.
Because publicity is considered to be among the primary purposes
of terrorism, a scale for measuring publicity was developed. Using this
scale, a publicity score was derived for each of the events considered in
this study. Measuring the amount of publicity which a terrorist event
generates could best be accomplished by aggregating the total coverage
given the event by all forms of news media. Unfortunately, because of
limited resources available to the research, a single source was chosen.
It was decided that the New York Times , from which all of the events were
being coded, would be used for the measurement of publicity. The assump-
tion, upon which the decision to measure publicity from a single source is
based, is that the New York Times accurately reflects the other forms of news
20

media in its coverage of an event. A nation-wide television newscast
probably gives more time and attention to the story of national interest
which the New York Times places on page one than it gives to the story on
page seventeen. The scores derived for publicity, then, reflect the
attention given events by the New York Times , but they are also considered
to be representative of total news coverage which events receive in the
United States.
Measuring publicity from a newspaper presents certain problems which
should be discussed. ^ The time at which a story is received by a newspaper
may determine where it is positioned and how much space is allocated for
it. A story of front page importance received too late for today's edition
may be superceded by events of more immediate concern and not receive a
front page position in tomorrows edition. Pictures catch the reader's eye
and contribute to the publicity value of a story. However, pictures are
not always available or may not be used because of space limitations. The
actual size of a story may determine whether it is placed at the top of
the page, above an advertisement, or down the side of the page. Finally,
the importance of a story in today's news must be evaluated relative to
the other stories in today's news. A given terrorist event might receive
more or less publicity because of the absence or presence of other news-
worthy events of greater importance.
The problems discussed above indicate that the measurement of terrorist
publicity as attempted in this research must be approached with caution.
4The recognition of several of the problems in measuring publicity
from a newspaper are the result of an interview with Mr. Albert Cross,
the Managing Editor of the Monterey Peninsula Herald .
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Certainly there are considerations beyond the impact of the event itself
which determine the amount of publicity which an event receives. Neverthe-
less, some events do receive front page coverage while others are buried
in the back of the paper. There are differences in the amount of publicity
which different terrorist events receive and those differences can be
measured.
The scale which was derived for measuring publicity can be found
under Variable 70 in the codebook which is contained in Appendix A. In
developing this scale, a story's location in the newspaper was considered
to be the most important element of publicity. Consequently, story loca-
tion is the primary determinant of an event's publicity score. Other
elements which also contribute to an event's score are story length and
the presence of a picture, map, or other graphic display. Because of the
assumptions and problems involved in measuring publicity, a minor differ-
ence between two scores may not accurately reflect a minor variance in
the actual publicity which two events received. But minor differences
are of little value to the analysis. It is the major differences which
are significant, and they can be confidently evaluated with the scale
which has been developed in this study.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE DATA
A. DATA AGGREGATION
The first step toward the analysis of the data collected during this
research consists of aggregation, i.e., the data are grouped on the basis
of similarities. It must be pointed out, however, that there are many
differences between international terrorist extortionary events, and
22

these differences are not always apparent. Every event is different in
various particulars from every other event. This is not meant to imply
that dissimilarities between events reduce the validity of analysis based
on aggregation of associated items. The author is acutely aware of the
fact that every terrorist event is unique; nevertheless, the events also
possess categorical similarities which can be validly aggregated and ana-
lyzed.
B. TYPES OF EVENTS MD THEIR FREQUENCY OF OCCURRENCE
For the period 1968-1975, there were 166 international terrorist
extortionary events identified and included in this study. A listing
of these events can be found in Appendix B. Although they represent only
a small portion of the total terrorist activity which has occurred during
the eight years examined, the listed events do contain all those which
were found and judged appropriate to the study according to the defini-
tional criteria previously discussed.
International terrorist extortionary events can be sorted into three
basic types. There are kidnappings, barricade incidents, and aircraft
hijackings. In a kidnapping, the victim is seized and carried off to some
unknown location. The kidnappers can communicate their demands indirectly
and need not expose themselves. In a barricade incident, the victims are
captured but not carried off. Rather, the terrorists hold their hostages
where captured and fortify the location against the police. In these
events, the terrorist's exposure is maximized, and direct communication
between the terrorists and authorities is enhanced. The third type of
event is the aircraft hijack. These events are characterized by the fact
23

that they take place aboard an aircraft. They could easily be thought of
as airborne barricade incidents, but the common characteristic that they
take place aboard aircraft justifies grouping them separately. The annual
frequency of all three types of events is tabulated below in Table I.
Table I.
Annual Frequency of Events by Type






1969 2 8 10
1970 16 1 12 29
1971 7 1 5 13
1972 10 3 11 24
1973 28 6 8 42
1974 11 7 3 21
1975 15 10 1 26
TOTAL 89 28 49 166
As Table I indicates, kidnapping is certainly the most popular method
of extortion employed by international terrorists and accounts for over half
of the total number of events. Kidnappings and barricade incidents both
show an upward trend. Hijackings, however, have declined over the last
24

three years. Even with this decline in the hijackings, the overall trend
in total number of events continues to rise.
C. KIDNAPPINGS
1. The Corporate Case
Of the 89 total kidnapping incidents examined, 38 can be classi-
fied as corporate cases. These events are distinguished from the others
in that the victim is a corporate official, employee, or relative of a
corporate official, and the demands are made solely on the corporation or
its officials. In three of these events, the nature of the demands are
unknown. In the 35 other cases the sole demand issued was for payment of
a ransom. An annual tabulation of the corporate case kidnappings is con-
tained in Table II.
Table II. Annual Tabulation of Corporate Case Kidnappings








1971 3 3 $ 97,000
1972 6 5 2,300,000
1973 22 14 26,918,000
1974 4 ?
1975 3 1
TOTAL 38 22 $29,315,000




During the peak year, 1973, over $41 million was demanded, and the
total ransom payments exceeded $26 million. There were also eight cases
in 1973 for which the amount of the ransom paid is unknown, and two events
in which no ransom was paid. During that year, a single event in which an
EXXON official was kidnapped netted a ransom payment of $14.2 million.
That event not only accounts for the highest single ransom payment about
which we know, but also marks the last event for which the amount of pay-
ment was disclosed. The reluctance to disclose ransom amounts is evidence
of the belief that such disclosure encourages future kidnappings.
Table III lists the countries in which corporate case kidnappings
have occurred. South American countries account for 89.5 percent of the
events, and the overwhelming majority, 73.7 percent took place in Argentina
alone.
Table III.
Geographical Breakdown of Corporate Case Kidnappings










Table IV lists the terrorist groups who have claimed responsibility
for corporate case kidnappings. It is interesting to note not only the
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organizations which have financed themselves through this type of extortion,
but also the number of events where the organization to which the kidnappers
belonged was not disclosed. In 23 of the 38 events, the terrorist group
which conducted the kidnapping was unknown. One can only speculate as to
how many of these were carried out by individuals who were not affiliated
with any politically motivated organization. Kidnapping corporate execu-
tives has proved to be a lucrative business, and there is no reason to as-
sume that common criminals as well as politically motivated groups have not
benefited from this type of extortionary event.
Table IV. Corporate Case Kidnappers
Organization
People's Revolutionary Army (ERP)
Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR)
Montoneros
Kachin Independence Army
National Liberation Army (ELN)
Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF)
Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR)
Unknown (UNK)









In one instance, the kidnappers, in their ransom demand, claimed to
be members of the ERP: the organization, however, publically disavowed any
role in the kidnapping. There are several possible reasons why a terrorist
organization might disavow its participation in an event or simply refuse
to identify itself. Certainly, the less information available to the
27

authorities, the greater is the problem presented to police trying to solve
the case. Accurate assessments of the activity levels as well as the
revenues of specific terrorist groups are impossible to make if the authori-
ties cannot determine who is responsible for which event. A final reason
might stem from fear of disillusioning the public. An organization which
seeks public support might not want the public to see how rich it has be-
come through terrorist extortion.
Corporate case kidnappings rank as the most successful type of terror-
ist extortionary event. In 29 of the 38 cases examined, the kidnappers
succeeded in extorting ransom for hostages. One case was evaluated as
being indifferent to success. In other words, terrorist gains and losses
cancelled each other out. Only two events were judged to be total failures
for the terrorists. An evaluation of terrorist success could not be made
in the remaining six instances because of insufficient information.
The cross impact matrix contained in Figure 2 shows the relationship
between ransom payment and the fate of the hostages for corporate case
kidnappings. The most striking point is that there are no events in which
it is known that the hostage was killed. The two events in which it is
known that no ransom was paid both involved executives who had been previ-
ously kidnapped and ransomed. In one, the hostage was rescued, and in the
other the hostage was released after convincing his captors that his com-

















(a) Includes one case of hostage rescue.
Figure 2. Corporate Case Kidnappings: Ransom
Payment vs. Hostage Fate
One of the twice kidnapped executives, Charles Lockwood, reported
after his first experience that his captors had said that kidnapping
executives was the best way to raise money. They had tried robbing banks,
but found out that kidnapping an important corporate official was easier,
less dangerous, and more profitable. The data collected in this study
certainly indicates that Mr. Lockwood' s abductors were correct in their
assessment of corporate case kidnappings.
2. Miscellaneous Kidnappings
If the 38 corporate cases are removed from the total of 89 kid-
nappings, 51 events remain to be analyzed. These events can be classified
as political and miscellaneous. The political kidnappings are those in
which diplomats, military personnel, other government representatives, or
relatives, are taken hostage, or the demands are targeted against govern-
ments. The miscellaneous category is provided for those cases which cannot
appropriately be called either political or corporate cases. There were
29

only four miscellaneous cases discovered during the research. The one
element that links these four events is that the kidnappers were apparently
more interested in the individual kidnapped than in extorting something
from someone else.
The first miscellaneous kidnapping involved the abduction of Hector
Minoni, the manager of United Press International in Uruguay by members of
OPR-33. No demands were issued by the terrorists, and Mr. Minoni was re-
leased the next day.
The second case was somewhat more complicated. The Eritrean Libera-
tion Front (ELF) asked Tenneco Corporation to send a helicopter to pick
up an ELF member who would negotiate the release of five Tenneco employees
being held by the ELF. When the helicopter arrived both it and the pilot,
Thomas Wyatt, were seized. The helicopter, piloted by Mr. Wyatt, was then
used to kidnap an American nurse, the victim in the following case.
Mr. Wyatt was released ten days later.
In the third case, Mrs. Dortzback, an American nurse, was kidnapped
from a rural Ethiopian hospital. Although a ransome demand for medical
supplies was issued, she was taken primarily to treat wounded ELF guer-
rillas. The ransom demands were rejected, and she was released after 26
days.
The final miscellaneous kidnapping was the abduction of Clyde Huddleson
in Beruit, Lebanon by unknown terrorists. His kidnappers believed he was
a CIA operative. After three days of interrogation he was released.
As has been seen, in the four miscellaneous kidnappings, the terrorists
were primarily interested in the victim himself on the services he could
provide. No ransoms were paid in any of the cases, and the victims were
all released unharmed after their captors were finished with them.
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3 . Political Kidnappings
a. An Overview
The category of political kidnapping includes all kidnapping
events which directly involve governments, either because of the type of
victim held hostage or the nature of the demands issued by the abductors.
There are 47 events in this category. Table V lists the annual frequency
of political kidnappings.
Table V. Annual Frequency of Political Kidnappings










The average number of political kidnappings was 5.875 per year.
Linear regression based on the number of events per year over the eight
year time span reveals an overall rising trend. The regression equation
predicts nine events of this type for 1976. However, the correlation coef-
ficient, r , is very low. r = .32. Consequently, little confidence can be
placed in the regression equation to accurately predict the number of events
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which will occur in the future. Figure 3 graphically displays the number











68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76
Regression Equation: y = 2.32 + .76 (x)
r = .32
Figure 3. Political Kidnappings per Year with Regression
Trend Line
b. The Hostage
The overwhelming majority of the political kidnappings have
involved government personnel. High government officials have been tbe
victim in 48.9 percent of the cases. Low government officials and govern-
ment employees added another 17 percent for a total of 65.9 percent. Mili-
tary personnel, corporate personnel, and private parties, e.g. tourists,
missionaries, students, etc., were victims of political kidnappers in
five events each, or a total of 31.9 percent of the cases. Relatives
of high government officials were kidnapped in three events. The number
of events in which each hostage type was taken is displayed in Table VI.
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The total number of political kidnappings was 47. Table VI shows a
total of 49 because two events involved hostages of two different types.
Table VI. Political Kidnap Hostages
Type Hostage Number of Events
1. High Government Officials 23
2. Low Government Officials/Employees 8
3. Military Officers 2
4. Military Enlisted 3
5. Corporate Officials 2
6. Corporate Employees 3
7. Prominent Opinion Leaders
8. Private Parties; e.g., tourists, 5
missionaries, students, etc.
9. Other (a) 3
TOTAL 49 (b)
NOTE: (a) The three events of Type 9, "Other," were kidnappings of
family members of high government officials.
(b) The total number of events is 49 vice 47 because two events
involved two different hostage types.
The large number of events in which high government officials
were kidnapped most probably reflects their value as hostages for the ter-
rorists. We might expect, then, that the importance which the terrorists
place on their demands is indicated by the importance of hostages they seize,
An examination of terrorist demands and the relationship between hostage
types and demands issued will be helpful in evaluating the value of the




Of the 47 political kidnapping events, the terrorists' demands
are unknown in seven cases. In the remaining 40 cases, 58 separate demands
were issued. The demand most frequently made was for prisoner release.
This demand was issued in over half of the events. Prisoner release was
demanded in 24 separate events. Ransom demands rank second in frequency
of occurrance with 12 events. The third most frequently issued demand was
for the publication or broadcast of a statement by the terrorists. This
demand was made in eight events. Amnesty or safe passage for the terror-
ists was demanded in four events. Other demands made by terrorists in-
clude armaments (1 event), specific political changes (2 events), change
of sentence for prisoners (1 event) , suspension of search for hostages
i
and kidnappers (3 events) , the closing of the Jewish emigre center at
Schoenau Castle (1 event) , and for prisoners to be shown on television to
prove they were in good health (1 event) . No demands were made in four
events. The far right hand column of Figure 4 gives the total number of
times specific demands were issued.
The cross-impact matrix contained in Figure 4 shows the rela-
tionship between hostage types and terrorist demands. Twenty-four events
contained demands for prisoner release. In 62.5 percent of these events,
high government officials were kidnapped. Low government officials and
government employees were victims in another 12.5 percent of these cases.
Government officials and employees were the victims in 75 percent of all
the political kidnappings in which prisoner release was demanded. It is
apparent that terrorists consider government personnel, especially high
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Ransom demands were made in 12 cases. In these events, the
victims were government personnel only five times. It appears that terror-
ists consider other categories besides government employees to be suitable
hostages for ransom demands. The value of corporate executives to terror-
ists seeking high ransoms has already been demonstrated,
d. Terrorist Success
In this study, five categories of terrorist success were
established. The terrorist success rating for an event is determined only
within the context of that event and its outcome. Success is measured
irrespective of the value of publicity generated by the event. The five
categories are: high success, moderate success, indifference, moderate
failure, and total failure. High success describes those events in which the
terrorists are overwhelmingly successful in having their demands met and
suffer no losses. Moderate success describes those events in which some
terrorist demands are met and/or the terrorist gains outweigh their losses.
The category indifference is used for situations in which the terrorists
neither gain nor lose, or the gains and losses cancel each other. Moderate
failure describes events in which terrorist losses exceed their gains.
Total failure means the terrorists suffered losses and achieved none of
their demands during the event.
Figure 5 shows the relationship between terrorist success and hostage
type for political kidnappings. Terrorist success is unknown for eight
events. The terrorists were successful in over one-half of the remaining
cases. If events within the indifference category are considered as
terrorist failures because the terrorists did not succeed in achieving their





1. High Success 822 11 33 20
2. Moderate Success 2 2
+j 3. Indifference 8 1 2 1 1 13
en w
•h w
05 4. Moderate Failure
u o
6 w 5. Total Failure 2 2 11 6
6. Unknown 3(a) 3 1(a) 1 8
TOTAL 23 8 2 3 2 3 5 3 49(b)
(a) Includes one event still in progress when the data was collected.
(b) The total number of events is 49 because two events contained two
different Hostage Types.
Figure 5. Political Kidnappings: Hostage
Type vs. Terrorist Success
interesting fact revealed in the Figure 6 matrix is that the events in-
volving high government officials, the apparently most valuable hostage
type, afforded the terrorists successes in only 10 cases, 50 percent of
the 20 events for which terrorist success was able to be measured. Little
confidence can be placed in statistical evaluation of the relationship
between other hostage types and terrorist success because of the small
numbers of events in which other hostage types were taken. However, it
does appear that in most of the cases, the hostage type does not signifi-
cantly effect terrorist success.
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It was thought that terrorist success might be correlated
with the type of demand issued. Unfortunately, the data does not allow an
analysis of this relationship, because terrorist success is measured by
event rather than by demand. Consequently, in events in which multiple
demands were issued the success of specific demands might not be known.
What did become apparent, however, is that when terrorists issue multiple
demands, they increase their chances of gaining at least a partial success,
The two most popular demands were for prisoner release and
ransom. The numbers of events during which these demands were made and
met were recorded. Prisoner release was demanded in 24 events. Figure
6 gives a breakdown of events in which prisoner release was demanded. The
prisoners were released in 9 cases (37.5 percent). They were not released
in 14 cases (58.3 percent). It is unknown whether or not the demand was
met in the remaining case (04.2 percent). High government officials were
the most frequently seized hostage where prisoner release was demanded.
When compared with all other hostage types, high government officials
proved to be the optimum hostage for terrorists seeking the release of
prisoners. High government officials were held hostage in seven of the
nine events in which prisoners were released (77.7 percent). However,
it must also be noted that eight of the fourteen cases (57.1 percent) in
which prisoners were not released also involved hostages who were high
government officials. Simply stated, the terrorists who kidnapped high
government officials were more successful in securing the release of
prisoners than were terrorists who kidnapped other types of hostages;
however, prisoner release was granted less than 50 percent of the time



















Total 15 9 24
Figure 6. Political Kidnappings: Hostage Type vs. Prisoner Release
Terrorists were slightly more successful with demands for
ransom than with demands for prisoner release. In six of twelve events
(50 percent) which included ransome demands, the ransom was paid. The
ransom was not paid in five events (41.7 percent). Whether or not the
ransom was paid is unknown for one event (8.3 percent). Of particular
interest are the four events in which high government officials were held
hostage. In these events, the terrorists succeeded in extorting a ran-
som in only one case. High government officials proved to be the optimum
hostages for events in which prisoner release was demanded, but poor
hostages for events in which money as demanded. Figure 7 shows the rela-
tionship between high government officials and all other hostage types













Paid 1 5 6
Not Paid 3 2 5
Unknown 1 1
Total 4 8 12
Figure 7. Political Kidnappings: Hostage Type vs. Ransom Payment
e. Third Party Government Involvement
A third party government is one which is not a direct partici-
pant in the struggle between the terrorist group and the government which
it opposes. In the vast majority of political kidnappings, the hostage
taken was a citizen of a third party country. Of the 47 political kid-
nappings, 37 were carried out by known terrorist organizations. One event
was perpetuated by an individual rather than a group. Nine events were
carried out by unknown terrorists, but a determination of third party in-
volvement was able to be made. Of the 46 events in which the third party
relationship was determined, 45 events included victims from third party
countries. Forty-two events took place within the opposition country,
and only four took place in third party countries. The opposition govern-
ment was the target of the extortion in 29 cases, and third parties were
targeted only eight times. Nine events contained either no extortion de-
mands, unknown demands, or unknown targets. Figure 8 shows the number of
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events in which opposition and third party governments have served as host,








Total 46 46 37 (a)
(a) Nine events contained no or unknown targets.
Figure 8. Political Kidnappings: Opposition and Third
Party Government Involvement
D. BARRICADE EVENTS
1. The Rising Trend
The first barricade incident took place in 1970. Since that first
event, the number of barricade incidents per year has grown slowly but
steadily. Whereas with political kidnappings, the number of events per
year jumped from two the first year, 1969, to sixteen the second, 1970;
the number of barricade incidents remained at one during the first two
years, 1970-1971, and began to increase slightly in the third year, 1972.
The number of barricade events per year is listed in Table VII and displayed
with the trend line derived from linear regression analysis in Figure 9.
Linear regression analysis of the number of barricade incidents
per year predicts that 10 events of this type will take place during 1976.
The correlation coefficient, r , is very high, indicating a close association
between time and the number of events. r = .95. Because the correlation
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y = -3.025 + 1.45 (x)
Figure 9. Barricade Incidents per Year with Regression Trend Line,



















coefficient is so high, considerable confidence can be placed in the
regression equation to accurately forecast the number of events which
will occur in the future. Between six and fourteen barricade events can
be predicted for 1976 with 95 percent confidence.
2. Terrorist Demands
The most frequently issued demand during barricade events was for
amnesty or safe passage for the terrorists conducting the event. This is,
of course, expected, because the terrorists would need safe passage in order
to insure their own safety upon conclusion of the event. The demand was
actually made in 16 events, and in three events safe passage was the sole
demand issued.
Prisoner release was the primary demand issued in 15 barricade
incidents. The majority of these demands, 53.3 percent, were made on the
hostage government rather than the host government. With political kid-
nappings, on the other hand, demands for prisoner release were targeted
at the host government in 91.6 percent of the cases. In two of the
barricade incidents, demands for prisoner release were targeted against
a government which was neither the host nor hostage government. Figure















Released 2 2 2 6
Prisoners
Not Released 3 6 9
Total 5 8 2 15
Figure 10. Barricade Events: Targets versus Outcomes where Prisoner
Release Demanded
3. Terrorist Success
From Figure 10 it can be determined that barricade events were
successful for extorting prisoner release 40 percent of the time. This is
remarkably close to the percentage of successful political kidnappings in
which prisoner release was demanded. Political kidnappers were successful
in 37.5 percent of those events. For barricade events in which prisoner
release was demanded, the hostage government was not only the most fre-
quently targeted, but also afforded terrorists the fewest successes.
Hostage governments refused to release prisoners in six events and released
them in only two events
.
In general, barricade events had an overall success rate of 42.8
percent. In 46.4 percent of these events the terrorists were captured and/or
killed. Three events, the remaining 10.8 percent, ended in a Bangkok Solu-
tion. These three events were evaluated as indifferent to success because
the terrorists dropped their initial demands in exchange for safe passage
out of the country.
44

Six countries have been the target of terrorist demands in more
than one barricade event. They are listed below in Table VIII along with
the event outcome. This list excludes those cases in which safe passage
demands were issued to host governments unless that was the sole demand
made during the event.
Table VIII. Barricade Events: Targets of Demands and Terrorist Success
Terrorist Bangkok Terrorist Total
Target Government Success Solution Failure Events
Israel 1 3 4
Jordan 2 1 3




U. S. A. 2 2
Israel has been targeted more than any other country, and has
never capitulated. Other countries who have rejected terrorist demands
and been targeted in subsequent barricade events are Federal Republic of
Germany, Netherlands, and the U.S.A. Only two coutries, Jordan and France,
have capitulated and been targeted during subsequent barricade events. It
does not appear that previous success significantly influences the selection
of extortion targets in barricade incidents.
There was a total of 24 host governments for barricade events.
Only three countries hosted more than one event. Sweden hosted two, both
of which were failures. France also hosted two events, both of these were
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successes; however, the second event developed after an unsuccessful
attack on an Israeli aircraft at Orly Airport, and the only demand was
for safe passage. This event was probably unplanned. The Netherlands
hosted three events, one success and two failures. It appears that pre-
vious successes or failures do not influence the selection of location
for barricade incidents. In fact, the large number of host governments
may very well indicate that terrorists prefer to strike in countries
without previous experience in managing a barricade incident. The large
number of host governments also points out the terrorist's advantage in
being able to choose the time and place of his attack.
E. AIRCRAFT HIJACKING
1. A Problem Solved
There have been over 250 aircraft hijackings worldwide since 1968.
The overwhelming majority of these events were not included in this study,
because third party governments were not required to make decisions which
would affect the fate of the hostages. Only 49 hijackings were found which
met that requirement. Although data was not collected on the excluded
events, they were examined during the research and some general conclusions
were formulated. Most of the events were conducted by individuals rather
than politically motivated organizations. Usually the hijacker asked for
nothing otner tnan to be taken to his desired destination. However, after
B.D. Cooper parachuted to freedom with $200,000 extorted from Northwest
Airlines in 1971, there followed a rash of hijackings in which money and




The peak years for aircraft hijackings were 1969-1970. Over 130
incidents took place during those two years alone, and most were entirely
successful, i.e., the hijacker got where he wanted to go. The reception
he received, however, was often not as expected. Years after the Cuban
government began imprisoning hijackers, individuals were still commandeer-
ing aircraft to Cuba.
Since the peak years for hijackings, the number of events per
year has been reduced steadily to only a few. Government policy, such as
Cuba's toward hijackers was not the most important cause in the reduction.
The major cause was improved security. Sky marshals and security agents
were placed on aircraft, and they succeeded in foiling several hijack
attempts. The best deterrent, however, proved to be the metal detection
device. Air piracy stopped when the potential hijacker could no longer
board the airplane with concealed weapons.
2 . Hijackings for Extortionary Purposes
When airport security and boarding procedures succeeded in stopping
hijackings, they also solved the problem of hijackings by international
terrorists for extortionary purposes. Only one event of this sort could
be found for 1975. Even though the hijacking problem appears to be solved,
and future hijackings should be rare and isolated incidents, an examination
of the 49 events isolated in this research should prove useful in further
testing the hypothesis that terrorist success encourages further terrorist
activity
.
In 20 events, hijacked aircraft were required to stop for fuel
enroute to the hijacker's destination. Four events ended during enroute
stops when local officials captured the hijackers or convinced them to
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surrender. Uruguay, Argentina, Uganda, and Cuba ended hijacking events
in this manner.
Prisoner release was demanded in 21 hijackings. Terrorists were
more successful in achieving the release of prisoners with hijackings
(47.6 percent) than with political kidnappings (37.5 percent) or barri-
cade events (40 percent). An examination of the success of hijackers in
extorting prisoner release over time reveals a dramatic shift from
capitulation by target governments to rejection of the demand. Table IX
lists the number of hijackings per year in which prisoner release was
demanded and achieved.











The first seven times that prisoner release was demanded, the
terrorists achieved it. However, they were successful in only three of
the remaining 14 events. The reason for the shift in the terrorist
success rate is difficult to isolate, but terrorist perserverance as












well as superior event planning and execution contributed to five of the
first seven initial successes. The Popular Front for the liberation of
Palestine (PFLP) conducted five successful hijackings for ptisoner release
between 1968 and 1970. They were successful in wresting prisoner release
from Israel in the first two events, but only after holding Israeli hos-
tages for 40 and 68 days respectively. In 1970, the PFLP won the release
of prisoners held in Switzerland, West Germany, and England in a single
well coordinated espisode which began with the simultaneous hijacking of
four aircraft on September 6. After a fifth airplane was hijacked on
September 9, the PFLP held over 300 hostages at "Revolution Airport" in
the Jordanian desert. Only three of the five hijackings became extor-
tionary events for prisoner release and they were coded separately because
of the definitional criteria established for data collection in this study.
However, intuitive judgement prefers to consider this episode as a single
event involving three aircraft rather than three separate events. If the
three events are reduced to one, then the number of successful "prisoner
release" events for 1970 is reduced from five to three, and the 1968-1970
record for successful "prisoner release" events is reduced from seven to
five.
Perhaps the reason for the dramatic shift in terrorist success between
the 1968-1970 period and the 1971-1975 period is simply that several govern-
ments who refused to capitulate in the second period had not been targeted
during the first period. Turkey (2 events); India, Venezuela, Colombia,
Cypress, and Iraq (1 event each) were targeted only during the 1971-1975
period and refused to release prisoners. Only two governments, Israel and
Greece, who had capitulated to prisoner release demands during the first
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period, rejected those demands in all events in which they were targeted
during the second period.
Terrorists demanding prisoner release after 1970 did not exhibit the
same levels of resolve as did the PFLP in their early events. In three
of the post-1970 events, the terrorists accepted asylum from the host
government after their prisoner release demands had been rejected by the
target government. In three events they flew to a friendly country for
asylum. Terrorists accepted a monetary ransom in lieu of prisoner release
in one event, and they surrendered to the host government in another. Three
events ended with terrorists being killed or captured by the host government.
Demands for prisoner release were issued to the host governments in
only five events. Normally, the terrorists hijacked the airplane to a
country other than the target of the prisoner release demands. Only one
of the four events targeted against host governments was successful in
achieving prisoner release. In two events the terrorists simply departed
after the target government rejected their demands. In the other two events,
the targeted host government killed or captured the terrorists.
Palestineans and their sympathizers conducted the majority of the hi-
jackings for prisoner release and also achieved the highest rate of success.
Figure 11 compares the results of Palestinean related events and all others.
Eighty percent of the successful hijackings for prisoner release worldwide
were conducted by Palestineans and their sympathizers. Palestinean related
events were successful twice as many times as not. Events which were not
Palestinean related were successful only 22 percent of the time. The Chi-
square test shows with 97 percent confidence that there is a positive rela-




















Figure 11. Hijackings for Prisoner Release: Palestinean Related versus
All Others
Palestinean hijackers not only succeeded in achieving the specific ob-
jectives of their operations, but they also succeeded in focusing world
attention on their cause. Because publicity for the terrorist is perhaps
the most important result of terrorism, it too shall be examined.
F. TERRORIST PUBLICITY
The problems and assumptions inherent in the measurement of terrorist
publicity as undertaken in this research have already been discussed. During
the analysis of the publicity data, it was discovered that time is a very
important factor in determining the amount of publicity which an event can
receive. The maximum publicity points which can be awarded an event for any
single day's news coverage is 45. A front page story over 20 column inches
long with a picture receives the 45 point maximum score. Because interest
in an event usually subsides quickly after it ends, the longer an event is
in progress, the greater is its ability to receive a high publicity score.
The effect of time points out the difference between the amount of publicity
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an event receives and the impact of that publicity. The event with the
largest publicity score is not necessarily the most memorable.
Perhaps the most memorable event of the 166 examined in this study
is the BSO's seizure of the Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics. This
event received 185 publicity points. The multiple hijacking event of
September 6, 1970 received 580 points, the maximum publicity score of
any event. If a control for the effect of time is applied by dividing
the publicity score by the number of days the event was in progress, an
indication of the impact of publicity is generated. Applying this pro-
cedure to the September 6, 1970 event (23 days) and the Olympics event
(1 day), shows that the multiple hijacking event has an impact score of
only 25.2, while the impact score for the Olympics event remains at 185.
Unfortunately, the algorithm (publicity score * length of event in days =
impact score) favors events of shorter duration and does not give a true
indication of the impact of the longer events. Accurate measurement of
the impact of terrorist publicity would require methods of data collection
and manipulation beyond the scope of this study.
The terrorist groups which have generated the greatest amounts of
publicity are listed in Table X. It must be noted that many non-extortionary
events have also been conducted by these organizations and the publicity
from those events is not reflected in this study.
Palestineans and the Japanese Pved Army, which has acted primarily in
concert with Palestineans, rank among the top four groups in total publicity
generated. Their activities not only shocked their world-wide audience,
but also served to focus its attention on the issue of forgotten Palestine.
Terrorist publicity which centered world attention on the Palestine issue
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Table X. Terrorist Groups with Higest Publicity Scores
Average
# of Total Publicity Publicity
Terrorist Group Events Score Per Event
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during the early 1970' s eventually led to the PLO's leader, Yassir Arafat,
being welcomed at the United Nations with honors suitable to a head of state,
G. TESTING THE HYPOTHESIS
The hypothesis that third party governments encourage or discourage
future terrorist extortionary activity by their reactions during current
events can best be. tested by examining those events in which a third party
government was the primary target of the terrorist demands. Exclusive of
demands for safe passage, aircraft fuel, and non-interference with the
departure of a hijacked aircraft, third party governments have been targeted
by terrorists 41 times. This figure may not be accurate, however, because
when the demand is for ransam, the terrorists are usually more interested
in the money itself than in who pays the ransom. Consequently, an analysis
of third party targets may not produce accurate results.
An examination of the third party governments most frequently involved
by terrorists in extortionary events and terrorist success might help to
test the hypothesis. Table XI shows the most frequently involved third
party governments for those events in which prisoner release and/or ransom
was demanded
.
With the exception of France and Great Britain, the third party govern-
ment involved does not appear to significantly affect the outcome of events
in which prisoner release and/or ransom were demanded. Of the five events
in which France was involved, she was the target of demands in three events,
the hostage government in one event, and the host government in one event.
France's reactions during the events in which she was not targeted are un-
known. During the three events in which she was targeted, France capitu-
lated. If the hypothesis that terrorist success encourages further
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Table XI. Third Party Countries Most Frequently Involved in
Events in Which Prisoner Release and/or Ransom was Demanded







West Germany 6 4 10
Great Britain 1 4 5
Netherlands 2 3 5
France 5 5
terrorist extortion, France would be expected to have been targeted
more than three times
.
The United States has a firm and well publicized policy of not re-
leasing prisoners or paying terrorist blackmail. This policy does not
stop other governments from meeting terrorist demands in events in which
citizens of the United States are taken hostage. However, the citizen-
ship of the hostage probably had little effect on decisions by target
governments to meet or reject terrorist demands. Nevertheless, even
though the United States has a firm policy against meeting terrorist
demands, she continues to be involved and targeted by international ter-
rorists. Of course, it is also impossible to know how many times terror-
ists have been deterred from involving the United States because of its
policy of rejection.
The variables which contribute to the success or failure of an ex-
tortionary event are so closely related that simple bi-variate analysis
cannot adequately expose the determinents of terrorist success. On the
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other hand, the patterns of extortionary events and the number of different
governments who have been cast in the varied roles within the events, makes
multi-variate analysis impractical because of the small number of cases in
which variables can be held constant.
The data collected in this research and its analysis neither prove
nor disprove the hypothesis that terrorist success encourages further ter-
rorist extortionary activity. The same variables and patterns of variables
which produce successful events also produce unsuccessful events. Further-
more, it appears that terrorists who conduct extortionary events are in-
fluenced more by the present objectives to be gained from an event than




The methodology employed for event coding and data collection offers
an effective means of recording information on terrorist extortion in a
form suitable for data analysis. However, terrorist events often contain
subtleties which are not reflected in the coded data. For example, the
data would not reflect the difference between a shootout initiated by police
and one initiated by the terrorists. The coding procedure is an effective
instrument for collecting data of a general nature but cannot accomodate
all of the details which are also often important. The best record of an
event would contain a narative as well as the coded information.
The overall trend in international terrorist extortionary events is
an upward one. Third party governments which have been involved by terror-
ists in extortionary events have been unable to protect themselves from
further involvement and exploitation by terrorists. The number of organi-
zations which practice international terrorist extortion is growing, as is
the number of third party governments which become involved by the terror-
ists. Although the practice is widespread, the terrorists have not enjoyed
overwhelming success in their extortions. If the rate of success from past
events is used to project a probability of success, then terrorists have
only a 53 percent chance of succeeding in an extortion.
It must be remembered that terrorist organizations are locked in a
struggle with their opposition government, not with third party governments.
Consequently, extortionary demands are usually directed at the opposition
government and third party governments are used by the terrorists for the
purpose of bringing additional pressure on the opposition government. This
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pattern has proven successful, and will undoubtedly continue to be employed
by terrorists seeking concessions from their opponents.
The hypothesis that terrorist success encourages further terrorist
extortionary activity has been examined in this research and the results
are inconclusive. Previous successes or failures may have very little
influence on future terrorist activity. However, there are some indica-
tions that the hypothesis is true. The large number of successful cor-
porate case kidnappings certainly indicates that success encourages similar
extortions. A possible indicator of the deterrent value of rejecting
terrorist demands is found in examining events involving Turkey. In six
events the Turkish People's Liberation Army (TPLA) targeted their opposi-
tion government, Turkey. The Turkish response was always total rejection
of the demands, regardless of the third party involved. Turkey's hard
line policy against her own internal terrorists may well have influenced
other terrorist organizations to reject Turkey when selecting third party
governments to exploit in an extortionary event. Not a single event was
found in which Turkey was the third party government.
Third party governments which imprison terrorists definitely increase
their susceptability to being targeted in an extortionary event. Some of
the most spectacular and daring events have been targeted at third party
governments holding captured terrorists. Perhaps because of this, some
governments have shown a reluctance to capture terrorists. The third
party government which is forced to host an event normally wants to end
the event quickly and save the hostages. Since capturing the terrorists
would make the host susceptable to being targeted in a future event, as
well as endanger the hostages, the Bangkok Solution appears to be a suit-
able compromise between host and terrorist. The safety of the hostages
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is secured, the host government does not need to worry about a future
attack for prisoner release, and the terrorists go free. Such a solution
is pragmatic and gives the host what he desires above all else, a quick
and simple conclusion to the event
.
Terrorist publicity is among the most important benefits terrorists
receive from an extortionary event. The longer they protract the event,
the more publicity the terrorists receive. The impact of publicity is not
as easy to determine. The Munich Olympics event offers a good example of
the publicity which terrorists can generate and the impact of that publicity,
The whole world watched through live television coverage as the drama un-
folded, and the world remembers, not that the event ended in total disaster
for the terrorists who were trying to flee the country, but the resolve,
determination, and patriotic daring of the BSO commandos.
The actual outcome of an event is often not as important as the event
itself in politically oriented acts of extortion. The first five barricade
events to secure prisoner release were unsuccessful in achieving that ob-
jective. The Munich event was among these early failures. The number of
barricade events has, nevertheless, increased each year since then. It
would appear that terrorist publicity influences future terrorist activity













Event Code: Month/Day /Year//Country (Code from WEIS) //Sequen-
tial Number for events beginning same date and country.
Date of Start: month/day /year
Place of Event: city, country (Country Code from WEIS); for




2. Seizure - barricade and hostage





6. Other transportation means takeover
7. Extortionate threat with no subsequent action
8. Kidnapping ending in barricade
9. Skyjack ending in barricade









6. Terrorist Group - as reported on scene: (3 digit code from
List of Terrorist Groups). Up to 4 groups. List in priority
of participation.
7. Opposition Government: (Code from WEIS)
The political opponent of the Terrorist Group. This will
normally be the legitimate and recognized "in-power" govern-
ment. It could also be an "out-of-power" political organization,




9. Other (Than Variable 6) Organization Claiming Responsibility:
(Code from List of Terrorist Groups)
10. Other (Than Variable 6) Organization Denying Responsibility:
(Code from List of Terrorist Groups)
11. Number of Terrorist Groups Participating:
12. Nationality or Home Government of Terrorists: (Code from WEIS)
13. Number of Terrorist Nationalities:
14. Number of Individual Terrorists Involved:
15. Number of Male Terrorists:
16. Number of Female Terrorists:









4. No pressure on Host Government
5. No response, response inappropriate, no opportunity
to respond
18. Hostages - By Country/ /Type-Number/ /Total
:
Hostage Types
1. High Government Officials
2. Low Government officials, Government Employees
3. Military Officers
4. Military Enlisted Personnel
5. Corporate Officials
6. Corporate Employees
7 . Prominent Opinion Leaders
8. Private Parties, e.g., tourists, missionaries, students
9. Other
19. Total Number of Hostages This Event:
20. Total Number of Hostage Governments:
21. Number of Governments Demands Made Upon:
22. Number of Non-Government Actors Demands Made Upon:
23. Target of Demands - Government and Non-Government Actors










6. Total cooperation with terrorists
7. Arrest with no shoot-out
24. Host Government/Response:
Response Codes as in Item 23




1. Ransom of Money or Monetary Equivalent
2. Armaments
3. Prisoner Release - Own Group
4. Prisoner Release - Not Own Group
5. Independence; Self Rule
6. Specific Political Changes
7. Amnesty or Safe Passage, may include Transportation
8. Publish or broad a statement by the terrorists
9. Change of sentence of (but still imprison) prisoners
10. Demands not made known - Terrorists unable to make
demands known
11. No demands made
12. Aircraft fuel
13. Red Cross inspection of Palestineans in Israeli prisons
14. Allow departure of hijacked aircraft
15. Suspension of search for kidnapper and victim
16. Protection of Palestinean Refugee Camps
17
.
Release of all Arabs detained in Israel
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26. Terrorist Negotiation Behavior:
1. Terrorists lessened demands during negotiations
2. Terrorists increased demands during negotiations
3. Terrorists did not change demands
4. Terrorists substituted demands during negotiations.
(Unable to state whether the change was an increase
or decrease)
5. Up-the-ante doublecross, e.g., more demands were
made after other side fulfilled their. part of the
bargain
6. Other side agreed to comply, terrorists broke contact
7. No contact for negotiations was even established
27. Subsequent Terrorist Demands:
Code as in Initial Demands
28. Primary Target Upon VThom Demands Were Made:
1. Host Government
2. Victim's Government




7. Other non-State Actors
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8. Aircraft — pilot and crew
9. Other
10. Combination of Targets
29. Type of Negotiator:
1. Police
2. High ranking Host Government official
3. Low ranking Host Government official
4. High ranking Victim Government official
5. Low ranking Victim Government official
6. High ranking foreign government official
7. Low ranking foreign government official
8. Corporate official
9. Private parties, family
10. Prominent opinion leaders
11. International Red Cross officials
12. Other
30. Number of Prisoners whose release was demanded:
31. Type of Ransom Demanded:




4. No Ransom Demanded
32. Amount of Ransom Demanded: (in thousands of dollars)





34. Number of Prisoners Released:
35. Amount of Robin Hood Ransom Paid: (in thousands of dollars)
36. Amount of Organizational Coffers Ransom Paid:
(in thousands of dollars)






6. No Ransom Paid
38. Fate of Hostages:
1. No damage nor casualties, hostages released, no
capitulation by targets
2. No damage nor casualties, hostages released,
capitulation or compromise by targets
3. Victims killed, no capitulation by targets
4. Victims killed, capitulation by targets
5. Damaged material, no capitulation by targets
6. Damaged material, capitulation by targets
7. Victim killed when attempting escape, had been
captured
8. Victim successfully escaped/rescued, had been captured
9. Victim killed attempting to avoid capture
10. Victim successfully avoided capture
11. Hostages killed in shoot-out (some/all hostages)
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12. Hostages killed, no provocation, during negotiations
(some/all hostages)
13. Hostages killed during negotiations, terrorist imposed
deadline had expired (some/all hostages)
14. No damage or casualties, no decision or action by
targets
15. Victim rescued during kidnap attempt
39. Number of hostages killed:
NOTE: ii 40 - // 48 applicable to terrorists conducting event and/or
prisoners released during event.
40. Number of nations publically denying that safe haven would
be granted if request were made:
41. Number of nations denying safe haven after request was made:
42. Identity of nations spontaneously denying safe haven:
43. Identity of nations denying safe haven request:
44. Number of nations spontaneously granting safe haven:
45. Number of nations granting safe haven on request:
46. Identity of nations spontaneously granting safe haven:
47. Identity of nations granting safe haven upon request:
48. Ultimate destination of group: (where the event ends)
49. Group view toward own death:
1. Suicidal
2. Willing to die, prefer not to
3. Elaborate getaway plans & execution of plans
4. Dropping of demands, safe passage, Bangkok Solution
5. Group view not tested. (Terrorists never exposed to
capture, i.e., kidnap and hide)
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50. Number of terrorists dead at scene of shootout:
51. Number of terrorists dead, blew selves up/suicide:
52. Number of terrorists dead via death penalty:
53. Number of terrorists captured:
54. Number of terrorists given long jail term:
55. Number of terrorists given long jail term, becoming subject
of demand in subsequent event:
56. Number of terrorists given long jail term, released due to
subsequent event:
57. Number of terrorists given short jail term (i.e., less than
5 years)
:
58. Number of terrorists given short jail term, becoming subject
of demand in subsequent event: (includes terrorists in
custody, not yet tried and/or sentenced)
59. Number of terrorists given short jail term, released due to
subsequent event: (includes terrorists in custody, not
yet tried and/or sentenced)
60. Number of terrorists freed by court verdict:
61. Number of terrorists escaped after capture or imprisonment:
62. Number of terrorists arrested, not brought to trial, freed
by other than court verdict, "surrendered" to friendly
government:
63. Number of terrorists never captured, remained at large:
64. Number of terrorists allowed to go free in Bangkok Solution:





66. Nation Requesting Extradition:
67. Was Extradition Request Granted:
1. Yes
2. No
68. Nation Receiving Extradition Request:
69. Was Publicity offered by negotiator as part of compromise:
1. Yes
2. No
70. Terrorist Publicity: (Total of New York Times news coverage)
Code from table below. Assign points only for the first
page in the newspaper upon which a story about the event is
located. Do not assign points for subsequent stories on the
same day. Bonus points for pictures and story length also
apply only to the first page on which the story appears.
Score publicity for all days during which the event is in
progress and for as long after its conclusion as it receives




Location of Story Score for story Score for story
Section I Other Section Without a picture with a picture
Page 1 25 35
2-3 Pag.a 1 15 25
4-5 2-3 10 15
6-7 4-5 7 10
8-9 6-7 5 7
10-11 8-9 4 5
12-13 10-11 3 4
13-20 12-13 2 3
20-end 13-end 1 2
Bonus points for story length:
Story between 10 and 20 column inches = + 5
Story over 20 column inches = + 10
71. Dollar Value of Property Losses During Event (in thousands)
:
72. Related Previous Events - Extortionary
List: Who - Terrorist Organization
Type Event (code as in Item //4)
Event Code (Item #1 of previous event)
73. Related Previous Events - Non-extortionary: Code as in Item //72
74. Related Subsequent Events - Extortionary; Code as in Item //72
75. Related Subsequent Events - Non-extortionary.' Code as in
Item //72
76. Date of Ending of Event: (month/day /year)










Number Wounded - Terrorists:
Number Wounded - Police/Military:
Number Wounded - Bystanders
:
Number Wounded - Hostages:
Number Killed - Police/Military:
Number Killed - Bystanders:
Terrorist Success:
1. High Success: Terrorists and/or Terrorist Organization
much better off, no terrorist losses,
total success, gains far outweight losses.
2. Minor Success: Terrorists and/or Terrorist Organization
somewhat better off, gains outweight
losses.
3. Indifference: Terrorists and/or Terrorist Organization
neither better nor worse off, gains and
losses cancel each other out.
4. Minor Losses: Terrorist losses outweight gains,
probably would not want a repeat of the
event.
5. Significant
Losses: Terrorist losses far outweight any pos-
sible gains, definitely would not want
a repeat of the event.
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LIST OF TERRORIST GROUPS
Code Number Terrorist Group
001 Individuals, not a terrorist group
861 12th of January Liberation Movement - Dominican Republic
862 Movimiento Popular Dominacano - Dominican Republic
863 23rd of September Communist League - Mexico
864 Arab Nationalist Youth for the Liberation of Palestine
865 Kachin Independence Army - Burma
866 Holger lleins Comando - West Germany
867 Organization of Sons of Occupied Territory - "Middle East
868 Al Fatah
869 Punto Cero - Venezuela
870 Eagles of National Unity - South Yemen
871 Martyr Abou Mahmoud Squad - Middle East
872 Sandanist National Liberation Front - Nicauragua
873 IRA - Irish Republican Army - Northern Ireland
874 South Moluccan Terrorists - Netherlands
875 Mohammed Boudia Guerilla Squad - Middle East
876 Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
877 Somali Coast Liberation Front
878 Peoples Revolutionary Party - Zaire
879 Rebel Shan Tribesmen - Burma
950 ELN - National Liberation Army - Colombia
951 Popular Movement for Liberation of Angola
952 PFLP - Popular Front for Liberation of Palestine -
Middle East
953 ELF - Eritrean Liberation Front - Ethiopia
954 BP - Black Panthers - United States
955 MIR - Leftist Revolutionary Movement - Chile
956 URA - Japanese Red Army - Japan
957 MR-8 - Revolutionary Movement of the Eight - Brazil
958 ALN - Action for National Liberation - Brazil
959 Palestine Popular Struggle Front - Middle East
960 FSLN - Sandinist Front of National Liberation - Nicaragua
961 VPR - Popular Revolutionary Vanguard - Brazil
962 FAR - Revolutionary Armed Forces - Guatemala
963 United Anti Reelection Command - Dominican Republic
964 FAL - Argentine Liberation Front - Argentina
965 MANO - Argentine National Organization Movement -
Argentina
National Liberation Front - India
ELN - National Liberation Army - Bolivia
Tupamaros - National Liberation Movement - Uruguay
JDL - Jewish Defense League
"'" FLQ - Quebec Liberation Front - Canada
Q71y,± ETA - Basque Nation and Liberty - Spain
TPLA - Turkish People's Liberation Army - Turkey
ERP - People's Revolutionary Army - Argentina








975 BSO - (Palestinean) Black September Organization
976 Croatians (general) - Yugoslavia
977 Montoneros - Argentina
978 Coalition of National Brigades - Haiti
979 Armed Revolutionary Forces of the People - Mexico
980 23rd of September Communist League - Mexico
981 Lebanese Socialist Revolutionary Organization
98^ Bandera Roja - Venezuela
983 FAR - Revolutionary Armed Forces - Argentina
984 Punishment Squad - Middle East
985 PLO - Palestine Liberation Organization - Middle East
986 Moslem International Guerrillas
987 FROLINAT - National Liberation Front of Chad
988 Iberian Liberation Movement - Spain
989 Republic of New Africa - United States
List of Non-Government Actors
901 Liegib's Meat Company





























9 9 Varig Airlines (Brazil)
922 American Airlines
923 Banco Popular (San Juan, Puerto Rico)Q24v Southern Airways
Q253 Sears, Roebuck and Company
9-JU Unknown Corporations
931 TWA - United States
y Western Airlines
^ Fiat of Argentina (Italian)
9^
r
Banco di Napoli (Italian)
Swift & Co. (meat packing company) (Argentina)





937 Phillips of the Netherlands
938 Vesty Corporation - British owned
939 Standard Electric of Argentina - U.S. owned
940 Eastern Airlines
941 First National Bank of Boston
942 Eastman Kodak
943 Nobleza Tobacco Company
944 Italo-Argentina Electric Company
945 Coca-Cola of Cordoba
946 Ford Motor Company
947 Firestone Tire & Rubber Company
948 Bank of Rio de la Plata - Italian owned
949 First National City Bank of New York















INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS EXTORTIONARY EVENTS
1968












Ecuadorian airliner hijacked to Cuba.
- TWA Boeing 707 hijacked to Syria.
C. Burke Elbrick, U.S. Ambassador, kidnapped in
Brazil.
Two Ecuadorian Air Force planes hijacked to Cuba.
Son and Secretary of Enrique S. Traessle, Swiss
Consul, kidnapped in Colombia.
TWA airliner hijacked to Italy
Two Lanica Airlines (Nicaraguan) air-liners
hijacked to Cuba.
Austral Airlines (Argentina) airliner hijacked
to Uruguay.
Brazilian airliner hijacked to Cuba.







Cruzeiro Do Sul Airlines (Brazilian) airliner
hijacked to Cuba.
TWA airliner hijacked to Lebanon.
t
Sean Holly, U.S. Labor Attache, kidnapped in
Guatemala.






March 29, 19 70
March 31, 1970
Lieutenant Colonel Donald J. Crowley, U.S. Air
Attache, kidnapped in Dominican Republic.
Joaquin Waldemar Sanchez, Paraguayan Consul,
kidnapped in Argentina.
i
Yuri Pivovarov, Soviet Assistant Commercial Attache,
kidnapped in Argentina.
Count Karl von Spreti, West German Ambassador,
kidnapped in Guatemala.















- Jack Fry, Peace Corps official, kidnapped in
Ethiopia.
- Jamaican airliner hijacked to Cuba.
- Morris Draper, U.S. Political Secretary, kidnapped
in Jordan.
Sixty foreigners held hostage in two hotels in
Amman, Jordan.
- Ehrenfried von Holleben, West German Ambassador,
kidnapped in Brazil.
Brazilian airliner hijacked to Cuba.
Two West German technicians kidnapped in Bolivia.
Olympic Airways (Greece) airliner hijacked to Cairo.
- Daniel A. Mitrione, U.S. Public Safety Adviser,
kidnapped in Uruguay.
- Aloisio Mares Dias Gomide, Brazilian Consul,
kidnapped in Uruguay.
- Claude Fly, U.S. agricultural Adviser, kidnapped
in Uruguay.
Pan American World Airways 747 hijacked to Cairo.
Swissair DC-8 (Switzerland) airliner hijacked to
Jordan.









BOAC VC-10 (Great Britain) airliner hijacked
to Jordan.
James R. Cross, British Trade Commissioner,
kidnapped in Canada.
Costa Rican airliner hijacked to Cuba.
United Airlines 727 plane hijacked to Cuba.
Eugene Beihl, Honorary West German Consul,
kidnapped in Spain.













July 2, 19 71
November 13, 1971
1971
Geoffrey M. S. Jackson, British Ambassador,
kidnapped in Uruguay.
Ethiopian airliner hijacked to Libya.
Indian Airlines plane hijacked to Pakistan.
Two Croatian emigres seize Yugoslavian Consulate
in Sweden.
James Finlay, U.S. Air Force Security Policeman,
kidnapped in Turkey.
Four U.S. servicemen kidnapped in Turkey,
Philippine Air Lines plane hijacked to China.
- Manager of U.S. owned gold mine kidnapped in Bolivia.
Ephraim Elrom, Israeli Consul General, kidnapped
in Turkey.
Stanley Sylvester, executive of Swift & Company
and honorary British Consul, kidnapped in
Argentina.
- Alfred Kuser, Swiss industrialist, kidnapped in
Bolivia.
Braniff Airlines plane hijacked to Argentina.

















Lufthansa German Airlines plane hijacked to
South Yemen.
Oberdan Sallustro, President of Fiat of Argentina,
kidnapped in Argentina.
- Three NATO civilian radar technicians kidnapped
in Turkey.
Turkish airliner hijacked to Bulgaria.
Sabena Belgian World Airlines plane hijacked to
Israel.
- South African Airways plane hijacked to Malawi.
Ernanno Barca, President of Banco di Napoli,
kidnapped in Argentina.
Hector Menoni, manager of United Press International,
kidnapped in Uruguay.
United Air Lines plane hijacked to Canada.
Al Yemda (South Yemeni) airliner hijacked to Libya.
The son of the Jordanian Ambassador kidnapped in
France.
Jan J. Van de Panne, Dutch executive of Philips
Argentina electronics firm, kidnapped in Argentina.








Scandinavian Airlines System (SAS) airliner hijacked
to Spain.
West German Consul kidnapped in Algeria.
Turkish airliner hijacked to Bulgaria.
Lufthansa German Airlines plane hijacked to Libya.
Enrico Barrella, Italian industrialist, kidnapped
in Argentina.
Southern Airways airliner hijacked to Cuba.






Felix Azpiazu, Spanish industrialist, kidnapped
in Argentina.
Donald Grove, Managing Director of the British
Vestey Industrial Group, kidnapped in Argentina.
Vicente Russo , Italian executive working for ITT
Corporation, kidnapped in Argentina.

















Two Italian businessmen kidnapped in Ethiopia.
Clinton E. Knox, U.S. Ambassador, kidnapped in
Haiti.
Norman Lee, Argentine executive of a Coco-Cola
bottling company, kidnapped in Argentina.
- Indian High Commission seized in London.
- Saudi Arabian Embassy seized in Khartoun, Sudan.
- Gerardo Scalmazzi, Manager of First National
Bank of Boston (Rosario Branch) , kidnapped in
Argentina.
- Anthony R. Da Cruz, Technical Operations Manager
of Eastman Kodak Company, kidnapped in Argentina.
Francis Victor Brimicombe, President of Nobleza
Tabacos, kidnapped in Argentina.
The son of the chairman of Itaio-Argentine Electric
Company (Swiss citizen), kidnapped in Argentina.
- Two Soviet doctors kidnapped in Burma.
Terrance G. Leonhardy, U.S. Consul General,
kidnapped in Mexico.
- Venezuelan airliner (AVENSA) hijacked to Cuba.
- Oscar Castel, Manager of Coco-Cola bottling plant,
kidnapped in Argentina.
Colombian airliner hijacked to Paraguay.


















general manager of an American firm,
kidnapped in Guatemala.
John R. Thompson, President of Firestone Tire &
Rubber Company, kidnapped in Argentina.
Mario Baratella, Vice-President of Italian owned
Bank of Rio de la Plata, kidnapped in Argentina.
Raul Bornancini, Assistant Manager of First National
City Bank of New York, kidnapped in Argentina.
Aerolineas Argentinas (Argentinean) airliner hijacked
to Cuba.
An attempt to seize the El Al Israel Airlines Office
in Athens, Greece failed. Consequently terrorists
seized hostages in a nearby hotel.
Japan Air Lines plane hijacked to Libya.
Yemen Airlines plane hijacked to Kuwait.
Ian Martin, British Citizen and manager of Liegib's
Meat Company, kidnapped in Paraguay.
September 5, 1973 - Saudi Arabian Embassy seized in Paris.
September 23, 1973
September 28, 1973 -






David George Heywood, executive of Nobleza Tabacos,
kidnapped in Argentina.
Three Jewish emigres and an Austrian customs official
seized on train in Austria.
Son of Francisco Garcia, the Mexican Ambassador,
kidnapped in Dominican Republic.
Two U.S. citizens employed by Frontino Goldmines,
kidnapped in Colombia.
Anthony Williams, British Consul, kidnapped in Mexico,
Bank of America office seized in Beirut, Lebanon.
Argentine Airlines plane hijacked to Cuba.





November 20, 1973 -
November 25, 1973 -
December 6, 1973
December 17, 1973
December 21, 1973 -
December 27, 1973 -
December 29, 1973 -
David Wilkie, Jr., President of Amoco Argentina,
kidnapped in Argentina.
Kurt Nagel, Honorary West German Consul,
kidnapped in Venezuela.
KLM Royal Dutch Airlines plane hijacked to Dubai,
Saudi Arabia.
Victor Samuelson, American executive of Exxon
Company, kidnapped in Argentina.
Lufthansa West German Airlines plane hijacked to
Kuwait
.
Charles Robert Hayes, American engineer for McKee-
Tesca Company, kidnapped in Argentina.
Thomas Niedermayer, West German industrialist,
kidnapped in Ireland.













Douglas G. Roberts, Argentine Director of Pepsi-Cola
Company, kidnapped in Argentina.
Eight hostages seized aboard a ferryboat in
Singapore.
Greek freighter (VORI) seized in Pakistan.
Japanese Embassy seized in Kuwait.
British Airways VC-10 hijacked to Netherlands.
East African Airways plane hijacked to Uganda.
John Patterson, U. S. Vice Consul, kidnapped in Mexico
Employees of Tenneco Company, Inc., kidnapped in
Ethiopia.
Alfred Laun, head of the U.S. Information Service
in Cordoba, kidnapped in Argentina.
Dr. Christoph Staewen, Swiss citizen, kidnapped in
Chad.

April 23, 1974 - Two nurses, one from the Netherlands and one from
New Zealand, kidnapped in Thailand.
May 3, 1974 - Paris banker kidnapped in France.
May 27, 1974 - Mr. Wyatt, Canadian pilot for Tenneco, kidnapped
in Ethiopia.
May 27, 1974 - Mrs. Dortzbach, U. S. nurse, kidnapped in Ethiopia.
June 14, 1974 - Herbert Pilz, West German official of Mercedes-Benz,
kidnapped in Argentina.
July 23, 1974 - Erich Breuss, Austrian official of Acindar steel
firm, kidnapped in Argentina.
September 13, 1974 - French Embassy seized in the Hague, Netherlands.
September 27, 1974 - Barbara Hutchison, U.S. Government official,
kidnapped in Dominican Republic. Venezuelan
Consulate also seized.
November 21, 1974 - British Airways VC-10 hijacked to Tunisia.
December 5, 1974 - Three French diplomats kidnapped in Mexico.
December 27, 1974 - Guests at party seized in Nicaragua.
1975
January 20, 1975 - Hostages seized at Orly Airport (France) after
unsuccessful rocket attack on Israeli aircraft.
January 31, 1975 - Mr. Leuipan, Dutch Consul, kidnapped in Colombia,
February 26, 1975 - Mr. Egan, U.S. Honary Consular, kidnapped in
Argentina.
March 1, 1975 - Iraqi Airways 737 hijacked to Iran.
March 4, 1975 - West German mining technician kidnapped in Burma.
March 23, 1975 - Guerry, French Ambassador, kidnapped in Somalia.
April 24, 1975 - West German Embassy in Stockholm seized.
April 29, 1975 - Israeli Embassy in Johannesburg seized.
May 19, 1975 - Four students (three U.S. citizens and one from
the Netherlands) , kidnapped in Tanzania.
82

June 29, 1975 - Morgan, U.S. military officer, kidnapped in Lebanon,
July 14, 1975 - Cambell and Harrel, U.S. corporate employees,
kidnapped in Ethiopia.
July 31, 1975 - Charles Lockwood, British corporate official,
kidnapped second time in Argentina.
August 4, 1975 - United States Embassy seized in Malaysia.
August 5, 1975 - Donald E. Cooper, U.S. corporate official of
Sears, Roebuck & Company, kidnapped in Colombia.
September 12, 1975 - Two U.S. servicemen kidnapped in Ethiopia.
September 15, 1975 - Egyptian Embassy seized in Madrid.
September 1975
(date unknown) - Donald Lutes, Canadian missionary, kidnapped in
Angola.
October 3, 1975 - Herrema, Dutch citizen, corporate employee,
kidnapped in Ireland.
October 8, 1975 - U.N. High Commission seized in Argentina.
October 22, 1975 - Gallagher and Dykes, U.S. Government officials,
kidnapped in Lebanon.
October 23, 1975 - Basil Burnwood-Taylor , British Government Official,
kidnapped in Ethiopia.
October 30, 1975 - Clyde Huddleston, U.S. corporate employee,
kidnapped in Beruit, Lebanon.
November 10, 1975 - Belgian Embassy seized in Tunisia.
December 3, 1975 - Dutch train seized in Netherlands.
December 4, 1975 - Indonesia Consulate seized in Netherlands.
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